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Abstract—The problem of detecting data anomaly is consid-
ered. Under the null hypothesis that models anomaly-free data,
measurements are assumed to be from an unknown distribution
with some authenticated historical samples. Under the compos-
ite alternative hypothesis, measurements are from an unknown
distribution positive distance away from the distribution under
the null hypothesis. No training data are available for the
distribution of anomaly data. A semi-supervised deep learning
technique based on an inverse generative adversary network is
proposed.
Index Terms—Detection and estimation, Deep learning,
Anomaly detection, Novelty detection, Semi-supervised learning,
Coincidence test.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of detecting data anomaly under
the following hypotheses. Under the null hypothesis H0
that models the anomaly-free data, measurements are from
some unknown distribution f0. Under the alternative H1
that models anomaly, measurements are from an unknown
distribution that is at least ǫ distance away from f0.
More precisely, given conditionally independent and iden-
tically distributed observationsZi, i = 1, · · · , N , we consider
the following hypothesis testing problem:
H0 : Zi ∼ f0 vs. H1 : Zi ∼ f1 ∈ F , (1)
where F = {f : ||f − f0|| > ǫ} and ‖ · ‖ can be
arbitrary distance measure such as the total variation or the
KL divergence.
We refer the problem as universal anomaly detection for
the reason that neither f0 nor f1 is known; nor do we assume
that they belong to some known parametric families. In the
paradigm of data-driven solutions to anomaly detection, we
assume instead that only a set of training samples Z0 =
{z01, · · · , z0T } under H0 is available.
The assumption that the alternative distribution is unknown
reflects the fact that data anomaly can happen in many ways,
including the possibility that an adversary may have tampered
the data in a man-in-the-middle attack [2]. Often in these
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cases, well-calibrated anomaly data are not available, or they
are insufficient for learning.
The assumption that the distribution under the null hypoth-
esis is unknown but with some training data is reasonable.
For instance, data may be measured under a quasi-stationary
environment that some samples can be authenticated but not
enough to estimate the distribution accurately. A data-driven
approach to anomaly detection may prefer using training
samples directly to construct a test rather than estimating
f0 first from the training data and using the estimated
distribution to construct a test.
The above hypothesis testing problem is general and has a
wide range of applications in power system state estimation
[1], image processing [3], and many others [4].
A. Related Work
There are limited results in the classical statistics and the
statistical signal processing literature that treats the hypoth-
esis testing problem above. Indeed, pathological examples
exist that consistent detection may not even possible [4]. The
problem is nonparametric and lacks a specific structure that
places the problem in a well-studied class. The presence of
training data under one hypothesis and the complete lack
of training data in the other makes the problem a special
machine learning problem. Here we review some recent
machine learning approaches.
In the machine learning literature, the above problem is
considered as semi-supervised anomaly detection [5]. Some
of the algorithms in this category can be classified into three
groups: (i) the clustering-based and nearest neighborhood-
based techniques, (ii) one-class support vector machine al-
gorithm and (iii) auto-encoder based neural-network ap-
proaches.
Clustering-based methods such as [6] rely on semi-
supervised clustering, assuming that the anomaly-free data
instances belong to a cluster whereas anomaly data do not.
Nearest neighborhood-based techniques [7] have a similar
assumption that the distance of a data instance to its nearest
neighbors is relatively small. Such topological assumptions
may not be appropriate for anomalies that arise from data
attacks where the attacker can manipulate data population.
The technique of one-class SVM [8] learns a hyperplane to
separate an anomaly-free region from the rest of the space.
A kernel function can be used to generalize the technique
for nonlinearly separable hypotheses. For the universal data
2anomaly detection, choosing the right kernel function is
highly nontrivial.
The auto-encoder based approaches [9], [10] train an
autoencoder on anomaly-free samples. The reconstruction
errors of new samples are used as test statistics for anomaly
detection. The work in [10] is a GAN based autoencoder
approach that uses a generator and the inverse of it together
to construct an autoencoder. Such techniques do not perform
well when the distributions of the anomaly and anomaly-free
data overlap such that a well-trained auto-encoder cannot
distinguish anomaly and anomaly-free distributions from
which the data sample is drawn.
The proposed technique in this paper builds on to our work
focuses on a power system application [1]. While both papers
rely on the idea of a coincidence test, the proposed method
in this paper (i) uses a different learning architecture for the
inverse generative model, (ii) uses a different learning algo-
rithm for the inverse generative model, and (iii) proposes a
new way of setting the threshold of the coincidence test. Also,
we provide more substantial numerical tests, including the
challenging problem of detecting unobservable data attacks.
B. Summary of contributions
We develop a novel anomaly detection approach consisting
of an inverse generative adversarial network, a quantizer, and
a non-parametric coincidence test, illustrated in Fig. 1 The
design of the three functional blocks is detailed in Sec. II.
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Fig. 1: A schematic of universal data anomaly detection.
The key idea that allows us to distinguish the null hypoth-
esis under f0 from the alternative distributions in F is rooted
in the classical birthday problem [11]: given M people in a
room, what is the coincidence probability Pc that there are
at least two people having the same birthday?
It turns out that this probability is the lowest when the un-
derlying birthday distribution is uniform [11]. This suggests
that a test on some measure of coincidence can serve as a
way to distinguish the uniform distribution from all other
distribution. Such a test was proposed earlier by David in
[12] and more recently by Paniski [13]. By thresholding, the
number of unique people who do not share a birthday with
others, the Paninski’s test is shown to have both false alarm
and miss-detection approaches to zero in the asymptotic
regime.
The contribution of this work is to transform the problem
of universal data anomaly detection to one of uniformity test
for which consistent tests such as Paninski’s coincidence test
can be applied. To this end, we employ an inverse generative
adversary network (iGAN) as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Comparing with existing solutions, the proposed approach
achieves diminishing detection error probabilities asymptot-
ically assuming the (iGAN) is trained successfully. In the
finite data sample regime, on the other hand, the proposed
approach has low sample complexity in the sense that the
number of testing samples is considerably smaller than the
size of the quantization alphabet.
We show through numerical examples that the proposed
universal data anomaly detection algorithm is effective for
some of the very challenging anomaly data scenarios, in-
cluding the so-called unobservable attacks in power systems.
II. UNIVERSAL ANOMALY DETECTION
A. A Schematic for Universal Anomaly Data Detection
The idea of the proposed universal anomaly detection is
captured in the schematic in Fig. 1. Observation samples
{Zi} are passed through an inverse generator H that maps
Zi ∼ f0 to uniformly distributed samples Yi ∼ U(0, 1) in
interval (0, 1). The existence of such a mapping is guaranteed
by the fact that the cumulative distribution function FZ(·) of
Zi is one but not the only one such mapping. Because f0
is unknown, the mapping is to be learned from the available
historical data as shown in Sec. II-B.
Upon successful training of the inverse generatorH , under
H0, analog samples Yi are approximately i.i.d. uniformly
distributed. They are then quantized uniformly withM levels,
which results in M -alphabet discrete uniformly distributed
samples Xi ∼ U(M).
A coincidence test using 1-coincidence statistic K1(x)
produces the test outcome. The threshold is set depending on
the level of acceptable false-alarm (the size) of the detector,
the quantization level M , the number of test samples N , and
the detection resolution ǫ. See Sec. II-D.
B. Inverse Generative Adversary Network
We propose the Wasserstein inverse generative adversary
network (WIGAN) to produce an inverse generative model.
Shown in Fig. 2, WIGAN is a modification of WGAN [14].
We use the 1-Wasserstein distance to measure the similarity
between probability distributions. In [14] it is demonstrated
that the Wasserstein distance is a more meaningful loss
metric that leads to an improved stability of the optimization
process.
WIGAN consists of two simultaneously trained neural
networks: (i) an inverse generator and (ii) a discriminator.
The training data passes through the inverse generator and the
output is tested against synthetic uniformly distributed data
by a discriminator. Ideally, the inverse generator converges
to a function that transforms the distribution of the data to
the uniform distribution.
An implementation of WIGAN is shown in Algorithm 1.
In our approach, the weights in both networks θI , θD are ini-
tialized randomly and updated with the learning rate of α. To
enforce the Lipschitz constraint of the 1-Wasserstein distance
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Fig. 2: An inverse generative adversary network (WIGAN)
learning of an inverse generator.
we used weight clipping with parameter c on discriminator’s
updates as it is used in [14]. The discriminator fθD is updated
more frequently than the inverse generator gθI . We used
RMSProp algorithm [15] for the weight updates.
Algorithm 1 WIGAN. The experiments in the paper used
the default values α = 0.001, c = 0.01, m = 100, n = 10.
Require: : α, the learning rate. c, the clipping parameter.
m, the batch size. n, the number of iterations of the
discriminator per generator iteration.
1: for Number of training iterations do
2: for t = 0, 1, ..., n do
3: Sample {Ui}mi=1 ∼ U(0, 1) from uniform distri-
bution.
4: Sample {Zi}mi=1 ∼ f0 from real data.
5: Update the discriminator parameters θD by de-
scending its stochastic gradient:
∇θD
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
fθD (Ui)− 1m
m∑
i=1
fθD(gθI (Zi))
]
6: θD ← clip(θD,−c, c)
7: Sample {Zi}mi=1 ∼ f0 from real data .
8: Update the inverse generator parameters θI by de-
scending its stochastic gradient:
∇θI
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
fθD(gθI (Zi)
]
C. Quantization and Coincidence Test
Once the inverse generator is learned, we have the trans-
formed data samples Yi that are uniformly distributed under
H0 and nonuniform underH1. Testing the uniformity of con-
tinuously distributed random samples without any assump-
tions on the density function is nontrivial [16]. Here we apply
the M -level uniform quantization to Yi, which gives us M -
ary discrete random samplesXi that are uniformly distributed
under H0. The distribution of Xi under H1 depends on the
hyper-parameter M , however. Whereas finding the optimal
choice ofM is beyond the scope of this paper, we assume, for
now, that almost everywhere in F , the inverse transformed
and quantized samples Xi is ǫ distance away from being
uniform.
At the heart of the proposed approach is the coincidence
test for uniformity proposed by Paninski [13] for the fol-
lowing binary hypotheses using conditionally IID samples
{Xi, i = 1, · · · , N} from M -alphabet discrete distributions
H′0 : Xi ∼ P0 = (
1
M
, · · · , 1
M
),
H′1 : Xi ∼ P1 ∈ {p = (p1, · · · , pM )| ||p− P0|| > ǫ}.
The intuition of uniformity test is that, when Xi are from
the uniform distribution, the probability of coincidence is the
lowest, and K1(x), the number of “unique” valued samples,
is the highest. Thus, Paninski’s test for uniformity is given
by
K1(x)
H′0
≷
H′1
Tα
where the threshold Tα is a function of false positive level
α as well as the alphabet size (quantization level) M , the
sample size N , and distance between two hypotheses ǫ.
Paninski showed that the coincidence test is consistent
so long as N grows faster than
√
M as N = o( 1
ǫ4
√
M).
Remarkably, the sample complexity can be significantly less
than the size of the alphabet. A large-deviation bound is later
established in [17].
D. Test threshold
When the sample size N is finite, choosing the right
threshold affects the true and false positive probabilities of
the detection. For the K1(x) test, setting the test threshold
amounts to evaluating the probability of the event that
K1(x) ≥ t.
Let P0(E) be the probability of event E under hypothesis
H0. The threshold Tα of the K1 coincidence test with the
constraint on the false-positive probability to no greater than
α is given by
Tα = min{t : P0(K1 ≤ t) ≤ α}. (2)
The computation of Tα amounts to evaluating P0(K = 1),
which was given by Von Mises in [11]:
P0(K1 = k) =
M∑
j=k
(−1)j+k
(
j
k
)(
m
j
)
N !
(N − j)!
(M − j)N−j
MN
.
III. SIMULATION
We present two sets of simulation results. The first sim-
ulation is based on a synthetic data set generated from
the two hypotheses. We used a composite hypothesis for
the alternative hypothesis to capture the variability of the
alternative hypotheses.
The second simulation is about the detection of what
is considered unobservable attack in power system state
estimation. Such attacks are crafted in such a way that all
existing techniques fail.
4A. Synthetic data
We tested the proposed method on Gaussian and Gaussian
Mixture models. We evaluated it on 2 scenarios,
Case 1: H0 : Zi ∼ N (0, 1) v .s . H1 : Zi ∼ N (µ, 1) where
−1 < µ < 1.
Case 2: H0 : Zi ∼ N (0, 1) v .s . H1 : Zi ∼ N (0, σ) where
0.5 < σ < 0.8.
We used 10000 anomaly-free training samples to train
the iWGAN. To test our algorithm, we generated 20000
batches of N = 50 samples from the distribution in H0
and in H1. For each batch, we varied the µ and σ. After
using the iWGAN, we simply used a fixed value of 200 for
the quantization parameter M for all experiments. However,
there is a space for improvement by choosing M more
judiciously.
For each case, we compared the proposed approach with
two major deep learning benchmarks: the autoencoder ap-
proach based on the reconstruction error of f-AnoGAN [10]
and the One-Class SVM [8]. We implemented all methods
on Python using the scikit-learn library [18] and TensorFlow
[19].
f-AnoGAN is based on the reconstruction error of the
autoencoder. It assumes to have lower reconstruction error
for anomaly-free data as it is trained using them. However,
when the support of the distribution of anomaly and anomaly-
free data overlap such as Case 1 this assumption is not true.
We trained the One-Class SVM using Radial Basis Func-
tion (RBF) as it had the best performance among the popular
kernel choices. One-Class SVM tests new samples according
to their closeness to the center of training samples. Similarly,
in Case 1 this method performed poorly. To see a more
extreme scenario, in Case 2 we tested a case where the
anomaly samples are much denser around the mean. Both
alternative methods performed significantly bad in that case,
where UAD was still reasonable. The ROC curve of the
detectors are presented in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3: ROC curves of the methods. Left: Case 1. Right:
Case 2.
B. Detection of unobservable attack
We present an application of the universal data anomaly
detection to perhaps one of the most challenging adversarial
data attack detection problems.
Consider a system with state vector x and measurement z
satisfying
z = h(x) + e
under the null hypothesis H0. We assume that we have
historical measurements under H0.
We assume the strongest attacker who has full access to
system measurement function and system state. Suppose that
the adversary can inject the so-called unobservable attack
a(x) = h(x + c) − h(x) into the measurement so that the
system control center observes
z = h(x) + e + a(x) = h(x+ c) + e,
which means that the control center is deceived to believe
that the actual state is x′ = x+ c.
Despite that the above attack appears to be unobservable
by any algebraic means, the attack vector a(x) does change
the underlying distribution of z, which is where the proposed
universal detection scheme can be effective in detecting such
an unobservable attack.
We simulated the unobservable attack on the IEEE 14 bus
transmission test system [20] using the load values in EPFL
smart grid data [21]. We designed an unobservable data attack
by corrupting two of the measurements. We implemented —
the J(x)-test based on the classical ξ2 test—and the deep
learning-based anomaly detection methods. We used 10000
data samples to train the algorithms and 10000 batches of
N = 50 samples from the attack-free samples and the
samples with unobservable data attack to test.
The J(x) could not detect the data attacks as they were
designed to be unobservable. However, the UAD detected it
by monitoring the changes on the distribution of samples.
One-Class SVM and f-AnoGAN also detected the bad data
as they are trained using the anomaly-free data, but they did
not perform as well as UAD possibly because the real data
did not satisfy their assumptions. The ROC curve is presented
in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4: ROC curve for the unobservable attack case.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a novel method for the problem of
detecting data anomaly under semi-supervised settings. The
proposed method is an extension of the coincidence uni-
formity test using deep generative adversary networks. The
proposed algorithm uses a direct approach to test the samples
without explicitly learning the distribution that makes it is
possible to have a decision using fewer samples. Numerical
tests show considerable gain over the state of the art anomaly
detection methods.
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